There is no such thing as a psychiatry that is too biological.
-S B Guze 1 So far, neurobiologists have made great progress using conventional techniques of anatomy and physiology to map the brain's visual circuitry. Two people have already received Nobel Prizes for this kind of work, and it has proven enormously valuable . . . The problem is that, after 50 years of work, neurobiologists still cannot explain a single visual perception, no matter how simple, in terms of visual circuitry. That tells you pretty clearly that something is wrong.
-D Purves 2, p 19
A Puzzle I t is a near universal belief among psychiatrists that the future of psychiatric theory and treatment lies in a reductionist research program. A belief in reduction in psychiatry is the view (roughly) that neuroscience-primarily cellular neurobiology-and molecular biology will, on their own, eventually provide an exhaustive explanation of mental illness and form the basis for treating it successfully.
A scientific commitment as widespread as the belief in reductionism in psychiatry is usually reserved for hypotheses for which there is overwhelming evidence. However, in fact, it is hard to find any explicit articulation of the evidence or arguments in favour of this view. Further, the commitment to reduction in psychiatry exists alongside considerable evidence from the history of science that reduction is very rare, even in physics where one most expects to find it. 3 It also exists despite the overwhelming antireductionism that has been held during the last 40 years by most philosophers of science concerned with the mind.
The puzzle is made more acute because reductionism in psychiatry is a radical view. In a well-known editorial, Insel and Quirion 4 say that "mental disorders [should] be understood and treated as brain disorders." p 2221 On this conception, reductionism entails that a successful theory of mental disorder will be solely, or largely, a biological theory. Reductionism has to be thought of in this radical way otherwise it has almost no content. If reductionism were merely the view that neuroscience will contribute something to understanding the mind, then there could hardly be a need for editorials to make that point. Who would need persuading? However, because reduction in psychiatry seems to be a topic about which one can debate-hence this article-it must be controversial. On this understanding of reduction, then, the psychological sciences are relegated to the status of mere placeholder sciences awaiting replacement by neuroscience and molecular biology. One would think that a view as dramatic as this would be hotly contested. In fact, however, reductionism seems to be all but dogma in psychiatry. Indeed, there seems to have been little challenge to Insel and Quirion's 4 views.
What justifies the widespread view in psychiatry-and in the public institutions that support it-that a successful psychiatry will be a theoretical and clinical science of the brain and the genes? The question is not only theoretically interesting, it is of immense practical importance for 2 reasons. First, it is arguable that one of the central motivations for current psychiatric practice derives from a commitment to reductionism. The belief that a successful psychiatry will be a branch of neuroscience and molecular biology no doubt seems like good evidence for focusing on pharmacological treatments of mental illness: if mental illness is a form of brain pathology, then one ought to treat the illness by ministering to the brain. Second, a vast amount of time and public resources are devoted to biological research into the causes of mental illness. It would be an unconscionable waste of these resources if they were spent without a good reason for thinking that biology holds the key to mental illness.
In the next section, I briefly review the concept of reductionism as it is understood in the philosophy of science. I then present and evaluate 2 arguments in favour of reduction in psychiatry. Finally, I offer a reason for skepticism about the future of reduction in psychiatry.
Intertheoretic Reduction
The word reduction is used in a great many ways in psychiatry and in other contexts; therefore, it is important to be clear about the sense in which I think it ought to be used and the way I will use it here.
Reduction in psychiatric contexts sometimes has one of several pejorative senses. Calling an outlook or explanation or hypothesis reductionist may mean that it is conceptually narrow; that it is deterministic (especially regarding genetic explanations); that it ignores the importance of the human person or their individuality; that it has something to do with the prescription of psychoactive drugs; or that it falsely reifies mental illness. No doubt other pejorative uses can also be found.
Philosophers of science have used reduction in a much more specific way and have developed several precise formulations of the concept of intertheoretic reduction (hereafter simply reduction). The classical account of reduction is found in Nagel's The Structure of Science. 5 Although other approaches to reduction have been developed since (Bickle 6 ), Nagel's conception is still thought of as the default position. Reduction is what one theory-the reducing theory-achieves regarding another theory-the reduced theory. Reduction of one theory by another occurs when one can infer the laws of the reduced theory from the laws of the reducing theory with the help of bridge laws-definitions that identify an element in the reduced theory with an element in the reducing theory. Consider genetics as an illustration. Prior to the advent of molecular biology, Mendel's laws expressed what we knew about genes. When molecular biology was developed, it was discovered, among other things, that a gene was, in fact, a stretch of a DNA molecule. It was then possible to write down a bridge law of the form: a gene is identical to a stretch of a DNA molecule. With this bridge law, among others, one could then use the resources of molecular biology to infer-as theorems, so to speak-Mendel's laws. Molecular biology thus reduced Mendelian genetics.
On this view, the reduction of psychiatry to biology would proceed as follows. First, there would have to be psychiatric laws of some sort relating, for example, trauma in early life with later depression; or personality type with psychosis; or whatever. Bridge laws would then have to be formulated that would link elements in psychiatric theory with elements in biology. For example, if learning played an explanatory role in psychiatric theory, we might formulate a bridge law such as: learning (of such-and-such a form) is identical to long-term potentiation. Once the required bridge laws were formulated, psychiatry could be reduced to biology if the laws of psychiatry could be inferred from the bridge laws together with some part of biology. Classical reduction is summarized in Table 1 .
The reduction of one theory to another is thought to be desirable because the reducing theory is generally thought to be, in some sense, a more fundamental theory than the reduced theory, as in the case of molecular biology. Thus reduction gives us a deeper insight into the phenomena of interest and will typically correct mistakes in the reduced theory. 7 For psychiatry, the prospect of a reduction to biology is attractive not only because it would illuminate mental illness-for example, result in a more accurate or systematic nosological system, or provide explanations of hitherto unexplained features of mental disorders based on underlying mechanisms-but also because it would, presumably, suggest ways in which mental illness could be treated by altering brain function. As an aside, it is worth noting that if one uses the word reduction in this sense, then neuroscience and genetics are unlikely to have equal roles in the reduction of psychiatry. Reduction involves an identification of elements in psychiatric theory with elements in a biological theory, but it is only plausible that neuroscience can provide those concepts as mental illness is presumed to be brain dysfunction. If genetics plays a role, it will be primarily to contribute to an explanation of how in the course of development the brain comes to be in a state which eventually leads to, or manifests as, a particular mental illness. However, whatever the scientific laws are that describe these phenomena, these cannot, in general, be used to infer psychological laws because, among other things, the processes act before an organism exhibits any psychological life. Genetics will be relevant in a reduction of psychiatry to the extent that gene expression in the mature brain is part of the characterization of brain function that is relevant to the development of mental illness. For example, if long-term learning involves changes in gene expression, as it seems to do, then those changes may play a role in reducing psychiatric theory. This is not true of the processes of gene expression that occur before the beginning of mental life.
Arguments for Reduction in Psychiatry
As I have already noted, it is surprisingly difficult to find explicit presentations of the considerations in favour of reductionism in psychiatry. Therefore, in this section, I discuss 2 arguments that might be adduced to support the reductionist view. I have chosen these because they seem to me to be superficially plausible and to speak to the views of psychiatrists.
Mind-Brain Identity
The most powerful idea leading to reductionism in psychiatry is, I suspect, the claim that the mind is identical to the brain; "the mind is what the brain does," as it is sometimes put. With this identity in hand, constructing an argument for reductionism is straightforward. The philosophers of neuroscience, Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland, 6 articulate one version if it:
[I]n general terms we already know how psychological phenomena arise: they arise from the evolutionary and ontogenetic articulation of matter, more specifically, from the articulation of biological organization. We therefore expect to understand the former in terms of the latter. The former is produced by the relevant articulation of the latter. p 48 Kendler 8 
expresses (but does not endorse) something similar:
This position [that is, biological reductionism] might be seen as a logical consequence of the rejection of Cartesian dualism. After all, if we agree that there are no mental processes that are independent of brain function, then should not all the causes of psychiatric disorders be reduced to brain processes? p 435
The argument can be summarized by saying that because the mind is identical to the brain, the science of the mind must be neuroscience, and the science of mental illness, clinical neuroscience. I suspect that this argument is largely responsible for the near universal acceptance of reduction in psychiatry because it seems to show that reduction is guaranteed as a direct consequence of the utterly uncontroversial claim of mind-brain identity. If all one needs to be a reductionist is to deny the existence of souls (at least outside of religious contexts), then how could any self-respecting psychiatrist fail to be one? Nonetheless, this argument depends on a mistake. Consider an argument (in the following paragraph) exactly parallel to that expressed by Churchland and Churchland 6 (in the passage above) for the view that a successful theory of earthquakes will be a molecular theory:
In general terms we already know how geological phenomena arise: they arise from the articulation of matter, more specifically, from the articulation of molecule types x, y, and z. We therefore expect to understand the former in terms of the latter. The former is produced by the relevant articulation of the latter.
It is perfectly obvious that this is a bad argument. As the argument in favour of mind-brain reduction has exactly the same structure, it must also be a bad argument, despite its considerable plausibility. What has gone wrong? What the argument W La Revue canadienne de psychiatrie, vol 54, no 8, août 2009 508 In Review about earthquakes shows is that facts about the physical universe-in particular, facts about the stuff that objects are made of-tell us nothing about the sciences or theories that will prove to be successful at explaining how those objects behave. That is, metaphysics has no consequences for the development of science. Which sciences or theories turn out to be successful depends on where, so to speak, the patterns in the universe can be found. 9 We can understand earthquakes by talking about plate tectonics and genes by talking about molecules. It may not be possible to develop a molecular theory of earthquakes or a theory of genes in terms of quarks. That is not because genes (and earthquakes) are not made of quarks; of course they are. It is rather because we can best understand genes and earthquakes by using concepts other than quarks, at least at this point in the history of science. (This claim is sometimes expressed as the view that there are different levels of explanation, though this way of putting it probably relies on the dubious notion of a hierarchy of sciences.)
The moral here is that the hypothesis that psychiatry will be reduced to biology is itself an empirical hypothesis; it cannot be decided by metaphysical arguments. It is an empirical hypothesis in the sense that it depends on the features of the psychological and neural sciences that we actually manage to develop. The plausibility of reduction can only be decided when we have in place a psychological science and a neuroscience that are mature enough to permit us to actually try to carry out at least part of the reduction. In response to this view, it is sometimes suggested that while reduction may turn out to be impossible in practice, the identity of mind and brain shows that it is possible in principle. This is fair enough; if you want to be able to call yourself a reductionist, then this is a safe way to do so because it is really no more than a verbal reformulation of mind-brain identity. However, in-principle reductionism achieves the goal (in Bertrand Russell's famous phrase) by theft rather than honest toil. In-principle reductionism gives us an understanding of the mind that is no better than in-practice antireductionism. And no psychiatrist will rejoice in being able to tell a patient that there is, in principle, a treatment for their condition, just nothing in practice.
Explanatory Success
A second important motivation for believing in reductionism in psychiatry is the success of neuroscience. Whereas the argument concerning mind-brain identity turns on the idea that psychiatry will collapse into neuroscience because the mind is just the brain, the success of neuroscience seems to support reduction because neuroscience can reach up, so to speak, and bring the phenomena of psychopathology into its orbit. How successful is neuroscience? It is undoubtedly true that in the last century-and, in particular, since the 1950s-we have undergone a revolutionary advance in our understanding of the brain. Uncertainty, even about so fundamental a problem as whether the brain is a single continuous organ or constituted of cells, has been replaced by a penetrating understanding of the internal molecular activity of neurons and how they interact with one another. A great deal more is also known about gross anatomy and the function of various brain regions, for example, although there is less certainty about the details.
What about the ability of neuroscience to explain mental life? If behavioural or cognitive neuroscience were having the same success as that enjoyed by fundamental neurobiology, the results should be striking. And indeed many people think they are. For example, Paul Churchland 10 says this:
[R]ecent research into neural networks . . . has produced the beginnings of a real understanding of how the biological brain works . . .
[W]e are now in a position to explain how our vivid sensory experience arises in the sensory cortex of our brains: how the smell of baking bread, the sound of an oboe, the taste of a peach, and the color of a sunrise are all embodied in a vast chorus of neural activity. We now have the resources to explain how the motor cortex, the cerebellum, and the spinal cord conduct an orchestra of muscles to perform the cheetah's dash, the falcon's strike, or the ballerina's dying swan. More centrally, we can now understand how the infant brain slowly develops a framework of concepts with which to comprehend the world. And we can see how the matured brain deploys that framework almost instantaneously: to recognize similarities, to grasp analogies, and to anticipate both the immediate and the distant future. p 4,5
One could find passages of this kind in the work of many writers. Many experts believe that we are at the beginning of a revolution in our understanding of the human mind, and that this will have consequences not only for science and for medicine but also for our understanding of art, 11 ethics, 12 the law, 13 economics, 14 and even marketing. 15 Nothing does more to rejuvenate a discipline at the moment than adding neuro-to its name.
One may argue that if neuroscience is revolutionizing our understanding of the mind, then there is good reason to believe that it will do the same for our understanding of psychopathology, and that the reduction of psychiatry to neuroscience is inevitable, if not, perhaps, imminent. Therefore, the best evidence for the plausibility of reduction in psychiatry is the tremendous explanatory power of the reducing theory. Unfortunately, however, much of this enthusiasm is just hype. Basic neurobiology has made tremendous advances, but our ability to explain real human behaviour is hardly different from that of Ramón y Cajal. We have almost no neurobiological understanding of the ballerina's dying swan, less still of the smell of baking bread, or the development of concepts in the infant brain. This is so obvious to anyone in the field that one hesitates to say it. Nevertheless, a systematic investigation of the best work in contemporary cognitive neuroscience does not reveal one area where neurobiology alone can explain a real psychological phenomenon. 16 One possible exception is the theory of elementary learning in the sea slug, Aplysia californica, owing to Eric Kandel et al, 17 though, even here, mathematical models of behaviour play a significant role.
One possible explanation for the systematic exaggeration of cognitive neuroscience's successes is precisely a conflation between it and basic neurobiology. However, there is a radical conceptual gap between neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience, and success in the one has not, so far, led to success in the other. The success of cognitive neuroscience, and the consequences of that success for reduction in psychiatry, has to be evaluated on its own terms and not as the inevitable development of fundamental neurobiology. The jury is still out; as is, therefore, the argument from that success to the inevitability of reduction in psychiatry. It is important to be clear that I am not suggesting that neuroscience does not illuminate cognitive phenomena. On the contrary, neuroscience is (or will be) an essential part of the theory of any psychological phenomenon. This is not the same thing as saying that neuroscience will be all or most of what there is to the theory of a psychological phenomenon. For all we know, the psychological sciences will be an equal, or dominant, partner in some of these theories. I am not even saying that neuroscience will never supplant the psychological sciences. Maybe it will; maybe it will not. We have to wait and see. All I am saying is that, at the moment, we have no reason to think that cognitive neuroscience will act as a reducing theory for psychiatry.
Skepticism About Reduction
Thus far I have been conservative. My aim has been to show that 2 tempting reasons for believing in reductionism in psychiatry are not very good ones; however, I have not offered any reasons for thinking that reduction is, or is not, a compelling position. As I have already emphasized, I do not think that there can be decisive arguments for or against reduction because reduction is an empirical hypothesis. Reductionism may succeed or it may not. And it may succeed in some areas of psychology (or regarding some psychiatric disorders) but not in others. Nonetheless, there may be considerations that make reduction seem more or less plausible. These call for investigation if only because they may justify some research programs more than others. I think that reduction in psychiatry is quite unlikely, and, in this section, I present one reason for my skepticism.
According to the reductionist, neuroscience and genetics promise an account of mental function. Biology would give us an account of the mind that would be analogous to an account of the heart or lungs as well as an account of mental pathology conceived of as deviations from the normal operation of the brain. Biological theories have 2 very broad components: a description of the structure of the organ or system of interest and a description of the function that the mechanism is supposed to perform. 18 To understand the workings of an organ or system, we have to know first of all what it does. Consider the heart: without some account of the heart as an organ that acts as a pump it would be very difficult to have any sort of cardiology. It would have been more difficult still to understand any of the properties of the heart-its electrical properties, say-without at least some rough idea of what it does. Because the function of the heart seems so obvious, it is easy not to notice the functional component of cardiac theory.
In the case of organs that have a more complex function, the functional theory of the organ becomes more salient. For example, it may be obvious that the lungs take in air. However, could one possibly explain-or have discovered-how the lungs function without the discovery that respiration is a form of combustion? It seems quite unlikely. 19 Accordingly, fundamental neurobiology provides us with both a structural and a functional account of the neuron. For example, we understand the electrical properties of neurons by knowing that the main function of a neuron is to produce an action potential; we understand the spatial arrangement of neurons-axons adjacent to dendrites with a gap between them-in terms of the function of a neuron to chemically modulate the state of its neighbour; and so on. However, all of this is local function-the function of individual neurons or small neuronal ensembles. An adequate theory of an organ or biological system requires an answer to the global functional question of what the organ or system does as a whole. What does the heart do? It pumps blood by changing in these and those ways. What do the kidneys do? It filters waste products by doing this and that. By analogy, we need an answer to the question, What does the brain do? Or-because the brain does a great many things-What does this or that brain system do?
In general, of course, it is not hard to establish that the visual system subserves vision. But exactly how does it do that? Similarly, how does the amygdala and other structures produce emotional states? How do the language centres develop to allow a person to master their language? How does the hippocampus contribute to long-term memory? Currently, the concepts required to answer these questions belong exclusively to psychology. Indeed, the questions themselves are psychological questions. If, as reduction requires, we were to restrict psychiatric theory to neuroscience and genetics, then a great deal of our understanding of mental illness would be lost in the process. Indeed, it is not clear whether much of anything would remain because the neurobiological knowledge concerning mental illness would be very hard to articulate.
Of course, it is true that much of what is said these days about mental illness seems to fly in the face of what I have just claimed. For example, it is supposed to be the case that depression is constituted by inadequate monoamine neurotransmission. Is not this sort of explanation, one might ask, just what the reductionist wants? Despite the overwhelming popularity of this claim, and others like it, it cannot be what the reductionist wants because the amine story tells us almost nothing about depression. Of course, it is useful to know that diminished serotonin or norepinephrine leads to depressed mood (assuming that turns out to be true), just as it is useful to know that if there is no gas in your car, it will not run. However, knowing that an absence of gas prevents a car from running tells you nothing about why gas is necessary or what an engine does with it. The same goes for the amine hypothesis: it tells us nothing about what depression is or how reduced neurotransmission brings it about. For that, we need a psychological theory of mood, including deviations from normal.
The argument can be summarized as follows: 1. Every biological theory requires a description of function.
2. Theories of global function-what a brain does in the life of an animal-belong to the psychological sciences.
3. Therefore, no account of the mind can currently be reduced without loss.
At this stage, the reductionist should point out that neuroscience is in its infancy, and that one of the tasks for the future will be for neuroscience to develop its own functional concepts so that it can dispense with those of psychology. This is undoubtedly the right strategy. If we are capable of achieving this, it could make reduction possible. However, at this stage we have no idea whether we will ever be able to develop such concepts. Whether we can or cannot will only be revealed by the future of science. Reduction in psychiatry is not impossible. No argument (to belabour the point) can demonstrate that. But it is important to see how serious an intellectual commitment the reductionist is making. Reduction cannot be achieved without a new set of concepts, and we as yet have no evidence that we can formulate them. Two morals follow from this. First, reductionists cannot claim that the success of reductionism is merely a matter of time; that once we've got enough data, we will have a solely biological psychiatry. More data will not be enough. Second, therefore, it is very much in the interests of the reductionist project to focus on quite abstract theories of brain function. Neuroscience is already sinking under the weight of its own data. What we need are better concepts to understand them. If this is to be possible, neuroscience will have to evolve from the deeply conservative science it is at the moment, to one willing to take some intellectual risks.
Is Reduction Impossible?
It is important to emphasize again that skepticism about reduction in psychiatry is not the same as the view that reduction is impossible. I have emphasized that the question of reduction can only be decided after the science has been done. Metaphysical (or other) arguments about what has to be the case are entirely at odds with general scientific method.
Nonetheless, considerations favouring the probability of one future or another are not only permissible but also necessary if we are to make rational decisions about which research programs to pursue. On the whole, it seems to me that reduction in psychiatry is not terribly likely; however, it is precisely the nature of scientific revolutions that they are, in some sense, unlikely. Moreover, skepticism about reduction does not imply that it is not something to be hoped for. On the contrary, I share the hope of many in the field that the sciences of the brain will revolutionize psychiatry, if by revolutionize we mean, among other things, improve. Nor does skepticism about reduction in psychiatry imply in the least that neuroscience and molecular biology will not be crucial to the theory and treatment of mental illness. On the contrary, it is very plausible that understanding the brain will help us understand disorders of the mind.
What skepticism about reduction does imply is that an understanding of mental illness and its treatment is unlikely to come solely from biology. As plausible as it is that neuroscience is necessary to psychiatry, it is equally plausible that various branches of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other disciplines will be equally or more important. This is not meant as anodyne pluralism. Without these other disciplines, it will be difficult to understand what the brain is doing-or failing to do-when someone is mentally ill. A solely biological theory of mental illness is not likely to be anywhere near complete.
Research into the biology of mental illness is enormously important; however, as with all research, it is a bet. Given how little we now know about mental illness, it would be foolhardy to ignore other lines of research. A biological theory of mental illness is something one might earnestly wish for; however, it is not yet a scientific reality. And if psychiatrists cannot distinguish between wishes and reality, who can?
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